Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004
English
Original: Spanish

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Report submitted by Spain on the implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in line with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (13 steps), to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

In accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (section 12, paragraph 15), the Government of the Kingdom of Spain is reporting below on measures it has taken to implement article VI, in relation to paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

Step 1: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT)

Spain fully endorses the objectives of the CTBT, having been one of the first States to ratify that Treaty, and actively supports the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Both individually and within the context of the European Union, Spain has been taking a number of diplomatic initiatives with third States to promote the universality and entry into force of the CTBT. One of the stations of the international monitoring system administered by the interim technical secretariat of the Preparatory Commission is located in Spain, which defrays part of the operating costs.

Step 2: Moratoriums on nuclear testing

Pending the achievement of universal ratification and the entry into force of the CTBT, moratoriums on nuclear testing or any other type of nuclear explosion constitute a significant contribution to international peace and security. Spain advocates that nuclear-weapon States should maintain and strengthen existing commitments to moratoriums on nuclear testing.

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Step 3: Negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the manufacture of fissionable material

Spain has supported various initiatives aimed at adopting a work programme in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and feels that negotiations should resume as soon as possible at that Conference to produce an international treaty that would set limits and controls on the manufacture of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons. More specifically, the issue of prohibiting the future manufacture of fissionable materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons should be raised during those negotiations. Pending such agreement and although moratoriums are an inadequate measure, Spain appreciates the moratoriums on the manufacture of fissionable materials declared unilaterally by States in possession of nuclear weapons (or of nuclear technology in general). In addition, at the appropriate time, another related issue, namely the disposal of existing stockpiles of fissionable materials, should also be addressed. Spain has supported the holding of workshops to discuss these issues organized informally in Geneva by the delegation of the Netherlands, and has participated in those workshops.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament within the context of the Conference on Disarmament

Without any doubt, one of the priority issues that the Conference on Disarmament should be able to discuss is nuclear disarmament. Spain believes it would be reasonable to establish an ad hoc body to pay this issue the attention it deserves.

Step 5: Irreversibility

In Spain's understanding, the principle of irreversibility should be considered an essential aspect of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms limitation rests specifically on the degree to which they are irreversible. Spain invites nuclear-weapon States to incorporate the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Step 6: Unequivocal commitment

Commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as reflected in article VI of the NPT and in the documents of the 2000 Review Conference, is an extremely important objective. Spain welcomes those nuclear stockpile reduction measures which have been adopted, and encourages all nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts to comply with this commitment.

Step 7: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

The international community can neither ignore the disarmament and arms control initiatives being taken bilaterally nor disregard the future potential of those initiatives. Bilateral disarmament and arms limitation constitute major contributions to international peace and security. Both within a bilateral and within a multilateral framework, transparency, irreversibility and verification are important factors. Spain has taken note of the denunciation by the United States of America of the ABM Treaty and the establishment between the United States and the Russian Federation

of a new strategic framework under the Moscow Agreement, and hopes that progress will be made both in terms of stockpile reduction and in terms of verification, transparency and irreversibility.

Step 8: Trilateral Initiative

Spain urges the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue and intensify their negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Trilateral Initiative, with a view to reaching, as soon as possible, agreement among the three parties on the IAEA system for verifying declared surpluses of fissionable material, including their irreversible elimination.

Step 9: Measures to be taken by nuclear-weapon States

Along with the great majority of countries that make up the international community, Spain considers that nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to comply with their commitment to maintaining international peace and security. In that context, the importance, stressed earlier, of transparency, verification and irreversibility, will bear highlighting. It would also be desirable for nuclear-weapon States to report regularly on their stockpiles, delivery systems, fissionable material reserves and exports of military technology. While it must be recognized that some nuclear-weapon States have demonstrated a significant degree of transparency, the fact still remains that the confidence-building measures and the advances made in this area have all assumed special importance and urgency. Because there can be no discounting the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist groups, non-nuclear-weapon States also have major responsibilities to assume in terms of verification and transparency. It is also essential, inter alia, to strengthen the role of IAEA. All States should participate in the IAEA system of safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, and more proactively, in the new concept of integrated safeguards or other developments of the system.

Spain also considers that non-strategic nuclear weapons should be reduced transparently and irreversibly.

Step 10: Arrangements by nuclear-weapon States concerning fissionable materials

Spain invites the nuclear-weapon States to adopt or expand unilateral measures for the reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, and to take appropriate action concerning declared surpluses of militarily usable fissionable material, especially their elimination under appropriate verification systems.

Step 11: General and complete disarmament

Spain participates actively in all international disarmament and non-proliferation forums and agreements relating to conventional stockpiles and weapons of mass destruction, and fully honours its political, legal and financial commitments. Spain is also a member of the export control regime: the close international cooperation in such export control systems is a fully legitimate and necessary complement to the general system of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Step 12: Reporting

Spain firmly supports the principle of periodic country reporting as part of the NPT review process.

Step 13: Development of verification capabilities

Spain considers that agreements and verification systems form an essential part of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Broadly speaking, measures that make for transparency, verification and confidence-building are key to the efforts that the international community is making towards the objective of "the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world".

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004

Original: English

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

In Accordance with the paragraph 16 on Regional Issues, sub paragraph 7 on the steps to promote the achievement of a NWFZ in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran reports the following:

1. Iran first initiated the idea of the establishment of a NWFZ as an important disarmament measure in the region of the Middle East in 1974, followed by the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. Since 1980, the General Assembly of the United Nations has annually adopted, by consensus, a resolution on this issue. Continuous adoption of this resolution at the General Assembly is the manifestation of the global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through realization of a NWFZ in the region.

2. As a State Party to the NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to its international undertakings and believes that this international instrument is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Universal adherence of this Treaty, in particular in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a NWFZ in the region. At present, Israel is the only non-party to the NPT in the region. Despite the repeated calls by the international community demonstrated in the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted by the NPT 1995 Review and Extension Conference, related resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of the IAEA and OIC, Israel, confident of the political and military support of the United States, has neither acceded to the NPT, nor placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Israel has not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty. Israel's clandestine nuclear activities, with the support of the United States, seriously threaten both regional peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

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3. The NPT 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East (1995). Due to the significant provisions of this resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other states in the region truly expect that this resolution should be swiftly implemented, especially by its co-sponsors, i.e. the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Northern Ireland as depositories of the NPT.

4. Unconditional adherence of Israel to the NPT and concluding the full-scope safeguard Agreement with the IAEA would, undoubtedly, lead to the early realization of the NWFZ in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitment voluntarily undertaken by this important resolution can only embolden Israel to continue to remain as a source of threat and instability in the Middle East by flouting the wish of the international community and remaining outside of the fold of the NPT and full-scope safeguard regime. In this context, we believe that national reports that do not address negative implications of Israel's intransigence to join NPT are not as effective as they ought to be in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. In implementing its obligations under the NPT and specifically Article II and III of the Treaty, all nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Furthermore to contribute to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction particularly in the Middle East, Iran has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and also joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran in its bilateral and multilateral disarmament dialogues with some Nuclear Weapons States and members of the European Union, including in the joint statement of 21 October 2003 by Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, has always urged their active contributions towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region of the Middle East.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the 2005 Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004

Original: English

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Implementation of article VI

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in implementation of paragraph 15(12) of Article VI Chapter of the Final Document of the NPT 2000 Review Conference, reports on the measures it has taken to implement Article VI and Paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for non-proliferation and Disarmament".

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that reporting, as envisaged in the step 12 of the thirteen steps, provides an essential element to ascertain the implementation of obligations assumed under article VI of the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the objectivity of our analysis on the progress towards the goal of nuclear disarmament would be best served through adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the strengthening review process.

I. Iran's approach towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty

3. Iran has been a party to the NPT since 1970, well before its entry into force, and this clearly demonstrates our long-standing support and commitment as a non-nuclear weapon state to this fundamental instrument. During the past three decades, Iran has done its utmost to achieve the objectives and purposes of the Treaty. In 1995, the Islamic Republic of Iran actively participated in the Review and Extension Conference and joined others in supporting the indefinite extension of the Treaty with the hope that the agreed package would pave the way for the early elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. The Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled its obligations under all provisions of the NPT. Iran's position, of denouncing the nuclear option, as a matter of principle, and placing its peaceful nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguard agreement, is a clear manifestation of our commitment to a strong NPT. Iran considers the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against its very basic principles. They have no place in Iran's defense doctrine. They do not add to Iran's security nor do they help rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, which is in Iran's supreme interests.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the NPT are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the "rights and obligations" enshrined in the treaty, preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages both NPT's universality and its full implementation.

6. In accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Nuclear Weapon States made an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The thirteen practical steps for the systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, as agreed in the 2000 Review

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Conference, should be vigorously pursued by Nuclear Weapons States. Therefore, no actions shall be made by any state, in particular Nuclear Weapon States, in contravention of those obligations. Regrettably, the new nuclear doctrine of the United States, through development of new types of nuclear weapons and setting rationale for the possible use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States and naming Non-Nuclear Weapon States as the targets of such new inhuman weapons, is a flagrant violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty and 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives and also the commitments made by the Nuclear Weapon States in the 2000 Review Conference.

II. Measures taken to implement Article VI

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran has actively participated in international efforts promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The initiatives taken towards this noble goal have always enjoyed our full support. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favour of the Resolutions entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world" (58/51), "A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons" (58/59) and "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons" (58/64) in the UNGA and other relevant resolutions adopted in the United Nations and other international fora.

8. In line with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Republic of Iran has, in various forums including before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), made its position clear that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international law and, is therefore illegal. As the ICJ stipulated in its advisory opinion in 1996 "*there exists an obligation to pursue, in good faith, and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control*". The Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously supported the Resolution adopted annually since 1999 entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the question of the legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons".

9. Iran considers the early establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to start negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, to be a concrete step relating to the materialization of nuclear disarmament.

10. The Islamic Republic of Iran played a prominent role during the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, hoping that the conclusion of the CTBT would prevent the qualitative as well as quantitative development of nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a signatory of the CTBT is an active member of the Preparatory Commission and hosts five International Monitoring System (IMS) stations.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement on 18 December 2003 and is provisionally implementing it. We regard this as another confidence building measure to reaffirm our commitment to the NPT. All these measures have been taken in a situation where negligence to the unsafeguarded facilities and the nuclear arsenal of Israel, which enjoys the tacit support of the United States, continues to threaten regional and international peace and security.

12. Due to the significant role that the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones plays in achieving a world entirely free from nuclear weapons, in 1974 Iran initiated the Resolution for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. Since 1980, this Resolution has been adopted annually by consensus in the UNGA. However, Israel, confident of the political and military support of the United States and through its persistent rejection of accession to any international disarmament instrument, and in particular NPT, remains the main obstacle for the establishment of such a zone.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004

Original: English

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Luxembourg

Introduction

Luxembourg considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be the main instrument of the international non-proliferation regime and calls for its full and effective implementation. The NPT is founded on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses. It plays a vital role in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.

Article I

Nuclear weapons States have the obligation to deny any transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to States or non-state actors that may seek to acquire such weapons or devices. An effective implementation of Article I by nuclear weapon States is therefore essential to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Article II

Luxembourg is dedicated to the principles of Article II and reaffirms its position that non-nuclear weapon States shall not seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Luxembourg remains also committed to its obligations under the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.

Luxembourg's full endorsement of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was announced in the Luxembourg Minister of Foreign Affairs' letter to the Director General of IAEA in March 2004. Luxembourg also supports the amendment to the

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Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and is one of the first States to have sent, in April 2004, its written support to the Austrian Government's initiative.

Article III

Luxembourg remains committed to the fact that the IAEA's international Safeguards System is an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, for Luxembourg, the Additional Protocol is an essential and integral part of the IAEA Safeguards System and its universal adoption and implementation should be strongly promoted. Through the "Loi du 1er août 2001 portant approbation d'un Protocole additionnel sur le renforcement de la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires destine à détecter les activités nucléaires clandestines", Luxembourg ratified an Additional Protocol and supports the Additional Protocol becoming a condition of supply for nuclear exports under the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Article IV

Luxembourg believes that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices should not hamper the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to benefit, if they so wish, from the peaceful use of nuclear energy in complete conformity with Art. I and II of the Treaty. However, any possible misuse of a civilian program must be strictly excluded. Effective IAEA verification standards are of utmost importance.

Article V

Through the "Loi du 11 mars 1999 portant approbation du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires, signé à New York, le 24 septembre 1996", Luxembourg ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and attaches great importance to the CTBT's entry into force at the earliest possible date.

Article VI

Luxembourg remains fully committed to the effective implementation of Art. VI of the NPT and fully supports the conclusions contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and to the Decisions and Resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

In the framework of general and complete disarmament, Luxembourg is a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Ottawa Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its amended Protocol II, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Luxembourg also provides financial support to mine clearance and related activities, as well as to small arms and light weapons disarmament in Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa.

Article VII

While itself not being a member of a nuclear-weapons-free zone, Luxembourg welcomes and encourages the concept of nuclear-weapons-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, as they strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute to enhancing global and regional peace and security.

Article VIII

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference's final decisions included a commitment to a Strengthened Treaty Review Process. Luxembourg attaches great importance to enhancing the performance and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Article IX

Luxembourg deplores the announcement of the DPRK in January 2003 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT and continues to urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with its international non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

In accordance with the European Union's Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, adopted in November 2003, Luxembourg will notably work towards universalisation of the NPT.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004
English
Original: French

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Report on the Middle East — pursuant to paragraph 16 (7) of the section on Article VII in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference — concerning the steps taken by France to promote the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East

France reaffirms its support for the objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

It calls for the implementation of that resolution by all the States concerned in order to progress towards a lasting peace in the Middle East and the creation in the region of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Hence the following statement, made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs at a news conference on the Middle East, on 30 April 2003:

> "The multilateral non-proliferation regime should apply to the whole region. It must be backed up by the definition of a new regional security framework based on confidence-building and non-aggression measures. The proposal for an area free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, presented by President Mubarak and based on United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991), provides a solid basis in this respect."

France has seized every opportunity at the bilateral and multilateral levels to stress the importance of the following measures:

- Establishment of a dialogue among all States in the region to restore lasting peace and stability in the Middle East;
- Compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation commitments made by all the States parties to the NPT;
- Cessation of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the region;
- Accession by all States to the relevant multilateral instruments, notably the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the

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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, and adherence by all States to the Hague Code of Conduct (ICOC);

- Adoption of comprehensive safeguards by all States which have committed themselves to doing so, and placing of all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
- Adoption and implementation by all States in the region of an IAEA Additional Protocol;
- Elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and of proliferating ballistic programmes;
- Strengthening of national measures to control exports of goods and technologies that may be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
- Prevention of the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
- Adherence by all regional States to the G8 principles adopted at Kananaskis;
- Identification and securing of all hazardous radiation sources in the region.

France will continue to work, in all the relevant forums and with all the States and partners concerned, towards the achievement of the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, particularly in the light of the present crisis in the region.

As it recalled in the General Debate, the European Union supports the objective of universality of the NPT. It recalls that, as far as the Middle East is concerned, this applies to Israel.

Through the process of dialogue between European countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran, France has encouraged actions aimed at restoring confidence, thus preserving the objectives of the 1995 resolution. It welcomes the signing and implementation by Iran of an Additional Protocol and encourages full cooperation with IAEA, as well as a rapid ratification of that Additional Protocol.

It also welcomes the progress made in the case of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in particular the following steps taken by that country: the dismantling of military nuclear programme components; corrective action conducted in cooperation with IAEA to ensure full compliance with the NPT and the comprehensive safeguards agreement; the signing and implementation of an Additional Protocol; the ratification of the CTBT; the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the effective elimination of existing chemical weapons stockpiles and of ballistic programmes with a range exceeding 300 km.

France encourages Iraq to make commitments reflecting its willingness to comply with the 1995 resolution, once it has recovered its sovereignty.

Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

4 May 2004

Original: English

Third session
New York, 26 April-7 May 2004

Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Austria

Article I:

Austria regards the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Thus, Austria continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to provide assistance or encouragement to States that may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.

Article II:

Austria continues to abide by her commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This commitment is implemented by the 1999 constitutional law on a nuclear-free Austria and by corresponding laws and regulations.

Article III:
Safeguards:

Before Austria's accession to the European Union, the requirement of article III, paragraph 1 was fulfilled by the Safeguards Agreement of 1972 between Austria and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Upon accession to the EU in 1995, the Safeguards Agreement between EURATOM, the EU non-nuclear weapon States and the IAEA entered into force for Austria and the 1972 Safeguards Agreement was suspended.

Austria has been at all times actively engaged in the process of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, to which it attaches utmost importance.

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With regard to the Additional Protocol between EURATOM, the EU non-nuclear-weapon States and the IAEA, which was signed in September 1998, Austria concluded all necessary steps on national level for entry-into-force in 2001. The Additional Protocols for the EU member States entered into force simultaneously on 30 April 2003.

Austria is a member of the informal group "Friends of the Additional Protocol" convened by Japan, which is working actively towards the universalisation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Austria considers the Additional Protocol to be an integral part of the IAEA's NPT safeguards system and the conclusion of an additional protocol to be mandatory under Article ifi of the Treaty.

Export controls:

Austria implements its obligation under article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty - not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article - , by controlling its exports in accordance with EU Council regulation (EC) 1334/2000 as amended.

Austria is a member of both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Since 1993 the Zangger Committee has been chaired by Dr. Fritz W. Schmidt of Austria. Under his chairmanship the Committee has recently launched an outreach programme and opened a website (www.zanggercommittee.org) to enhance transparency and foster dialogue with non-members.

In Austria's view an effective export control system facilitates co-operation for peaceful purposes in the nuclear field.

Physical Protection

Austria attaches great importance to a high level of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It has actively participated in the Open-Ended Group of Legal and Technical Experts convened by the Director General of the IAEA to prepare a well-defined amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In September 2003, the Austrian Foreign Minister has taken the initiative to submit an amendment proposal based on the outcome of the Expert Group to the IAEA Director General with the request to convene a diplomatic conference for its adoption. This amendment proposal will be submitted to the IAEA Director General on behalf of Austria and of some 25-30 States Parties in May 2004.

In Austria's view, physical protection is part of the national nuclear security system that has to be required as a condition for nuclear supplies in 2002 and 2003, respectively.

Article IV:

Following a referendum in 1978, Austria has renounced the use of nuclear energy for power generation and does not operate nuclear power plants. In view of the high risks emanating from nuclear installations, Austria attaches utmost importance to international efforts to harmonize and steadily increase all aspects of nuclear safety. Austria is party to both the Convention on Nuclear Safety as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and has actively participated in the Review Conferences of these Conventions.

Article V:

The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that the provisions of Article V are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Austria signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 when opened for signature and deposited her instrument of ratification on 13 March 1998. In advance of the 2003 Article XIV Conference to Facilitate Entry-into-Force of the CTBT held from 3-5 September 2003 in Vienna, the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Finland and Japan wrote to all their counterparts in all non-ratified states and urged them to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. Furthermore, Austria fully supports the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat and attaches particular importance to the swift establishment of the Treaty's international verification system. Austria hosts one radionuclide laboratory (ATLO3) at the Austrian Research Centers Seibersdorf, which was certified as the first of 16 radionuclide laboratories worldwide already in November 2001.

Article VI:

Austria's objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Consequently, Austria continues to call upon all nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with their obligations under Article VI. Austria accords high priority to the 13 Practical Steps towards nuclear disarmament which were agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. While acknowledging and welcoming progress in the reduction of nuclear weapons, Austria urges nuclear-weapon States to fully implement all 13 Practical Steps which serve as an important yardstick against which progress in the fulfillment of Article VI can be measured.

In view of the obligations of all NPT Parties to strive for general and complete disarmament, Austria is also a State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention, the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention and the Outer Space Treaty and spares no efforts to fully implement them.

Article VII:

Austria welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear weapon free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally-agreed criteria.

Article VIII:

The indefinite extension of the NPT and accompanying decisions in 1995 included a commitment to a strengthened review process. In this regard, Austria attaches particular importance to enhancing the performance of and accountability under the Treaty, in particular by submitting reports on the implementation of the Treaty to the meetings of the Preparatory Committee as well as to the Review Conferences.

Article IX:

Austria attaches high importance to the universalisation of the Treaty and continues to urge India, Israel and Pakistan to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with Article IX.

Article X:

Austria deplored the announcement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 10 January 2003 of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Austria continues to urge the DPRK to reverse its decision and to comply fully with all nuclear non-proliferation norms, in particular with its obligations contained in the NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.